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High Court Rejects Split Trial in Superyacht Negligence Case
- Aug 6, 2025
- Latest Journal
In a significant ruling for professional negligence litigators, earlier this year the High Court refused an application for a split trial in Tatiana Soroka v Payne Hicks Beach, a professional negligence claim arising from one of the UK’s most high-profile divorce settlements.
Ms Soroka, who was awarded £453 million following the breakdown of her marriage to oligarch Farkhad Akhmedov, alleged that her former solicitors, Payne Hicks Beach, acted negligently in failing to advise her to pursue enforcement against the £150 million superyacht Luna. She contended that had she been advised correctly she would have enhanced her recovery under the financial remedy order.
Payne Hicks Beach denied the allegations, arguing there was:
i. no breach of duty;
ii. no duty of care was owed in the manner claimed; and
iii. no causative loss.
Request for a Split Trial Refused
Ms Soroka sought to divide the proceedings into two phases: first, to resolve issues of breach of duty; and second, to address causation and loss. Her legal team argued that a staged approach would streamline litigation and reduce costs. Master Kaye, sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge, refused the application.
The following issues were a factor in the judge’s decision to refuse the application:
i. Fuzzy lines
Split trials carry "dangers and unintended consequences" due to the risk of an apparently bright line between issues being "not so bright or perhaps a little bit fuzzy". If the issues are not cleanly separated, there is a danger that some issues might end up falling down a gap between the two trials.
The starting point is assessing whether there is a "sufficiently clear bright line between the issues" to justify a split. Even if possible in principle, the judge must adopt a common-sense, pragmatic approach to decide whether a split trial is just and efficient.
ii. The dangers of overlap between the trial on liability and the trial on causation
The judge further asserted that overlap can lead to unintended consequences, satellite disputes and difficulties. Attempts to narrowly define trial one risked “either leaving a gap or creating an overlap" across breach, duty, and causation. There was no obvious means of avoiding such an overlap; all relevant material is needed at once to properly assess key issues. The judge expressed "a real nagging doubt that the clear bright line was not clear or bright", and was not persuaded by the proposed split in this matter.
iii. Timing and delay
Master Kaye noted that because the full trial could be heard by late 2026, and splitting would delay resolution until sometime in 2028, it was not in the interests of justice.
iv. ADR and settlement
In this case, the judgment confirmed that a split trial was highly unlikely to enhance the prospects of an early settlement and more likely to delay the time parties can consider settlement.
v. Issues with witness evidence
Master Kaye also held that witnesses already have limited recollection of the events in 2017. A split trial would require many witnesses to testify twice, which is unfair and would lead to "risks inherent in witnesses giving evidence covering the same ground twice". Repeating evidence after 10 years had the potential to affect reliability.
Furthermore, revisiting the same matters could offer witnesses "a trial run", giving rise to unfairness and inefficiency. The need for the same experts to attend trial twice and give overlapping evidence also weighed against a split.
vi. Costs
Splitting trials means additional time, and consequently costs. In this case, a cost-saving existed only if the Claimant lost at trial one, but "no obvious substantial saving" could be guaranteed. The judge held that this was not a claim where a resolution of breach and duty would lead to an obvious immediate window of opportunity to settle.
vii. Prejudice
Concern was raised that delays from a split trial would prejudice other court users, as two trials consume more resources and delay other cases. If different judges preside over each trial, any fuzziness in the first trial would cause inevitable complications in the second.
The judge also considered that “it also seems to me to represent the right balance in terms of costs and benefit. It seems to me the reasonable and proportionate approach consistent with the overriding objective”.
Shortly after judgment was given, Ms Soroka withdrew her claim.
Practical Implications
This decision is an interesting example of judicial reasoning around split trials in professional negligence cases. It reaffirms that split trials will remain the exception. Courts will have to consider whether proposed divisions are workable, and whether the savings or efficiencies are real. Where breach, duty, causation and loss are heavily interlinked, a split trial is unlikely to be ordered.
The decision reinforces judicial reluctance to grant split trials without a compelling case management reason, serving as an important reminder that courts prioritise efficiency, fairness, and the overriding objective.
Further Information
If you have any questions regarding this blog, please contact Jemma Brimblecombe or Úna Campbell in our Dispute Resolution team.
About the authors
Jemma Brimblecombe
Partner
(+44) 020 3535 1570
jbrimblecombe@kingsleynapley.co.uk
Jemma is widely recognised for her skills and experience in commercial litigation. She acts for both claimants and defendants in a wide range of sectors, including financial services, legal services, accountancy, and construction.
Úna Campbell (she/her)
Trainee Solicitor
+44 (0)20 3535 1689
ucampbell@kingsleynapley.co.uk
Úna is a trainee solicitor, currently sitting in the Dispute Resolution team. She works on a wide variety of litigation matters.